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COMMENTS
ENFORCEABILITY OF CHARITABLE SUBSCRIPTIONS
IN WISCONSIN
Charitable organizations are assuming a prominent role in our daily
lives. The Red Cross, the Community Chest, various fraternal organ-
izations and churches are but a few of those who seek donations to be
expended on a worthy cause. To what extent a legal obligation attaches
to the pledge or so-called charitable subscription which one often signs
when donating to these organizations is a timely question. The follow-
ing is a survey of the Wisconsin law on chariable subscriptions.
Subscription contracts for charitable organizations have been up-
held by American courts on three distinct grounds: (1) as a bilateral
contract, the promise of each subscriber being the consideration for
the promise of the other ;1 (2) as a unilateral contract, obligatory upon
the commencement or completion of that for which the donation was
offeredf and (3) promissory estoppel, the theory being that the sub-
scriber has made a gift promise which induced a forseeable change of
position.8
Wisconsin decisions present an interesting chronological study of
the struggles of a single state court with the problem of charitable
subscriptions. In an early case, Lathrop v. Knapp,4 subscribers agreed
to contribute certain sums to be used in purchasing a tract of land
which would prove satisfactory to a committee selected by all of the
subscribers. The land was purchased for less than the contemplated
amount. Sufficient money had been paid in by subscribers other than
the defendant to meet the purchase price. In a suit by a trustee to ob-
tain the amount subscribed by the defendant the Court found the
promise to be enforceable. Chief Justice Dixon, writing the majority
opinion, stated:
"* * * and the question is, shall the agreement fail for want of
consideration? I say, clearly not. In my judgment it is emphati-
cally one of those cases in which it has been held, and rightly
held, where several promise to contribute to a common object,
that the promise of each is a good consideration for the promise
of the others. It seems to be clear beyond doubt that such was
the consideration, or one of the considerations upon which each
subscriber put down his name, and that the same is plainly to be
inferred from the terms and obvious import of the paper."
The mutual promises were likened to a composition of creditors. Such
a composition is not binding when one creditor agrees with the debtor
IOwenby v. Georgia Baptist Assembly, 137 Ga. 698, 74 S.E. 56 (1912).
2 1 Williston on Contracts, sec. 116.
3 Restatement of Contracts, sec. 90.
4 Lathrop v. Knapp, 27 Wis. 214 (1870).
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to mitigate his debt and no new consideration is given,5 but where
several creditors agree with the debtor, each knowing of the promise
of the other, the promise of each is the consideration for the promise
of the others and the contract is binding upon all."
The Lathrop case might have established for all time the bilateral
contract approach in Wisconsin. However, Justice Dixon went on in
the same opinion to lay the foundation for a unilateral contract theory:
"This advancement of money by the other subscribers and pur-
chase of the lands did, within all the authorized operate to bind
the defendant, if he was not bound before."
Later Wisconsin decisions upholding charitable subscriptions have
put primary emphasis on this second principle of the Lathrop decisionJ
namely:
"* * * where something has been done or some liability or duty
assumed, in reliance upon the subscription, in order to carry out
the object, the promises are binding and may be enforced al-
though no pecuniary advantage is to result to the promisors." s
In the La Fayette Monument case defendant promised to give a
certain sum of money if an additional amount was raised by the county
board through taxes. The promise was held enforceable where the
county board procured the stipulated sum. The court said the sub-
scription was conditional, the condition was performed in reliance on
the promise, and this was consideration sufficient to support the con-
tract. 9 This is clearly the unilateral contract approach.
Gibbons v. Ginsel ° is also cited as authority in Wisconsin for this
proposition:
"Where * * * the persons to whom the subscriptions run have
expended money or incurred obligations on the faith of such
subscriptions, it is sufficient consideration to support the promise
to pay."
In the Gibbons case the subscriptions were offered to the assignors of
the plaintiff if they would construct a certain building. That which
was bargained for was completed, namely, the building, and the promise
was held enforceable as a unilateral contract. The same principle has
been applied in subsequent cases."
5 Otto Klauber, 23 Wis. 471 (1868) ; Perkins v. Lockwood, 100 Mass. 249 (1868).6 Eaton v. Lincoln, 13 Mass. 424 (1816).
7 Supra, note 4.
8 Quoted in Lathrop v. Knapp, supra, note 4, from Metcalf on Law of Contracts,
page 185.
9 LaFayette Monument Corporation v. Magoon, 73 Wis. 627, 42 N.W. 17 (1889).
1o Gibbons v. Ginsel, 79 Wis. 365, 48 N.W. 255 (1891).
11 The Board of Trustees of The Seven, Day Baptist Memorial Fund v. Saunders,
84 Wis. 570, 54 N.W. 1094 (1893) ; Superior Consolidated Land Co. v. Beck-
ford, 93 Wis. 220, 67 N.W. 45 (1896).
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At this point a curious meander in the Wisconsin decisions should
be noted. A subscription contract may not be enforced if it has not
been accepted for the promise by someone with actual authority. This
is so even though acts have been performed by the promisee relying
on the promise. In the Church of un Prairie case a promise to "give
the last' hundred dollars" was not held binding despite the fact that
some of the funds collected from other subscriptions simultaneously
made had been expended to reduce the debt of the plaintiff. 2 The
promise had been given to the minister of the congregation and he had
not received the actual authority to solicit or accept such offers for
the church by a vote of the corporate trustees. Not having been formal-
ly accepted no binding contract arose. Leonard v. Lent cited and fol-
lowed the foregoing case on a similar set of facts.
13
However, in the Consolidated Land case where an agent had pro-
cured a subscription from the defendant, the latter was bound on the
contract after the corporation for whom the subscription was procured
had performed relying on the contract, despite the fact that there had
been no formal acceptance by the principal.' 4 No formal acceptance
was deemed necessary, the court considering such work expended on
the faith of the promise sufficient acceptance. The Church of Sun
Prairie decision'5 and the Leonard case' 6 were dismissed in the follow-
ing language:
"The cases of Methodist Episcopal Church v. Sherman, 36 Wis.
404 and Leonard v. Lent, 43 Wis. 83, where subscriptions to
assist in paying off church debts were held not binding because
never accepted by the church corporation or by any authorized
agent of the corporations in any way, have no bearing on this
case."
It is submitted that the two cases dismissed so summarily differ from
the Consolidated Land case only in that the solicitor of the subscrip-
tions was not actually authorized to solicit the subscriptions in the
former. In the Consolidated Land decision there is no showing that
the agent had any actual authority to accept the subscriptions, but actual
authority to solicit is assumed in the decision. In all three cases acts
were done or money expended on the faith of the subscription promise.
Thus it would seem where the agent is not actually authorized to solicit
or accept subscriptions, the corporate acceptance must be formal by a
vote of the trustees and merely acting on the faith of the agreement
will not suffice. But where the agent is actually authorized to solicit
1' The Methodist Episocpal Churcs of Sun Prairie v. Sherman, 36 Wis. 404
(1874).
Is Leonard v. Lent, 43 Wis. 83 (1877).
'. Superior Consolidated Land Company v. Beckford, 93 Wis. 220, 67 N.W. 45(1896).
15 Supra, note 12.
16 Supra, note 13.
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the subscriptions, action taken relying on the promise will be a suffici-
ent acceptance.
In Re McCanna's Estate" in one way clarifies Wisconsin law and in
another leaves many questions still to be answered. There the deceased
promised "in consideration of the mutual promises and subscriptions
of other persons made for said purposes" to subscribe a specified sum
solicited by the pastor. However, the pastor had not received the actual
authority to solicit or accept such subscriptions from the corporate
trustees. Subsequent to the death of McCanna the trustees "accepted"
the offer. In a suit against the estate to collect the amount subscribed,
the court held the subscription unenforceable because no action had
been taken on the faith of the promise prior to his death. Up to this
point the decision is consonant with the foregoing cases, that if the
solicitor had no actual authority to solicit or accept, formal acceptance
plus action would be necessary to bind the subscriber. The problem was
then raised whether the promises of the subscribers could make the
subscription binding prior to death:
"In support of the objection filed to the claim, the defense con-
tends that the mutual promises of other subscribers to agree-
inents to the same effect as McCanna's agreement do not consti-
tute good consideration to render the subscription enforceable as
a contractual obligation. The question raised by that contention
has not been definitely decided by this court. It was involved in
Lathrop v. Knapp 8 in which Chief Justice Dixon considered
such mutual promises sufficient as consideration * * *. Subse-
quently, the question was raised in several cases, but was not de-
cided, on the ground that the party to whom it ran had on the
faith thereof, made expenditures or incurred obligations which
were held to constitute sufficient consideration to support the
promised subscription.
There are no such grounds, however, in the case at bar.
There is no proof that either St. Judes Church or any subscriber
advanced any money or incurred any obligation on the faith of
McCanna's subscription prior to his death. In discussing the
conflict in the authorities as to whether the promise of a sub-
scriber constitutes sufficient consideration for the promise of the
other subscribers it is stated in 1 Page, Contracts, p. 943, par
561, that,
'In jurisdictions in which the consideration may move from
from a third person, the mutual promises of the subscribers,
if actually intended by them as consideration should be held
to be sufficient consideration for the promise to pay such
subscription to the charitable organization, if such organiza-
tion, or the representative thereof, is a party to such con-
17 In Re McCanna's Estate: Roesch v. St. Jude's Church, 230 Wis. 561, 284 N.W.
502 (1939).
Is Supra, note 4.
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tract. The great weight of authority is to the effect that if
the contract is made between the subscriber and the benefici-
ary, so that the beneficiary is a party to the contract, the
beneficiary may maintain an action upon such contract in all
jurisdictions in which the consideration need not move from
the promisee.'
Under the majority rule, which can be considered applicable
in this jurisdiction,"9 in view of our rule that a stranger to a con-
tract who is a beneficiary thereunder may maintain an action
thereon, even though the consideration did not move from him
(Tweeddale v. Tweeddale, 116 Wis. 517, 93 N.W. 440) there is
in this case still the question as to whether it can be held that
the agreement for the subscription was made between St. Judes
Church and McCanna so that the Church was a party thereto as
a matter of law. Whether the Church was legally a party to and
bound by the agreement depends on the effect in law of Rev.
Hanz's action in writing the words "Saint Judes Church, by
Joseph E. Hanz." after the word "accepted" at the foot of the
agreement."
It was decided that the pastor had received no actual authority from
the corporate trustees to solicit or accept the conract for the church
and therefore the church was not a party to the conract. The majority
rule, cited by the court, envisions the following situation: A promises
C in consideration of B's promise to C. C here can be considered the
promisee provided that C makes himself a party either by his own
acceptance of the promise or by receiving the promise through an agent
authorized to solicit it. In this manner C becomes a party to the con-
tract, although he has neither furnished any consideration, nor can
he be sued. Under this rule where a duly authorized agent solicits
subscriptions and the mutual promises of the subscribers are in con-
sideration of the promises of the other subscribers running to the
charity, an enforceable contract will then result without the necessity
of the charity having done anything on the faith of the promise.
The doctrine of Tweeddale v. Tweeddale0 cited by the court to sus-
tain the foregoing rule does not seem apposite. That case is applicable
to the following example: A promises B for the benefit of C in con-
sideration of B's promise to A for the benefit of C. The rights of C
vest immediately as donee beneficiary. Although not a party to the
contract C has a right to sue thereon. No acceptance or acts on the
part of C are required. Had the principle of the Tweeddale case been
applicable the church would not have been required to become a party
to the contract. If the contract was made for the benefit of the church,
and the subscribers had actually made promises to each other, the sub-
scribers would be the parties to the contract and as such could not
29 Italics ours.
2O Tweeddale v. Tweeddale, 116 Wis. 517, 93 N.W. 440 (1903).
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have relieved themselves from the obligation without the consent of
the beneficiary. The doctrine of the Tweeddale case is perverted, and
it is not quite clear just what the court means unless it intends to use
that decision merely as authority for the proposition that the considera-
tion need not move from the charity. The use of the word "party"
in discussing the Tweeddale case is confusing.
In other jurisdictions, notably New York, a third ground has been
developed for the enforcement of these types of subscriptions.21 Com-
monly known as promissory estoppel, the rule is best framed in the
Restatement of Contracts:
"A promise which the promisor would reasonably expect to in-
duce action or forbearance of a definite and substantial char-
acter on the part of the promisee and which does induce such
action or forbearance is binding if injustice can be avoided only
by enforcement of the promise. 22
This doctrine has not gained a foothold in Wisconsin. An examination
of the Wisconsin cases cited reveals that the promises are generally
sustained on the theory of a unilateral contract since that which was
performed was always bargained for.
The following is offered as a summary of the Wisconsin decisions,
with the qualification that the court has at no time drawn its lines as
precisely as this summary would seem to indicate. A charitable sub-
scription is binding when the following two elements concur: 1) Con-
sideration in the form of a unilateral act which can move from the
charity to the promisor or from a third person to the charity, and 2)
the charity is made a party to the contract either by formal acceptance
of the promise or by solicitation through an authorized agent. The
word party, as used here, merely establishes privity of contract and
must not be confused with a bilateral contract. Of course, the possi-
bility of a bilateral contract between the charity and the subscriber is
not foreclosed if the subscription agreement is appropriately drafted, 3
or if the subscribers can be brought together in such a way that mutual
promises are exchanged between them, the charity may be vested with
rights as a true donee beneficiary.
ROBERT BACHMAN
21 Snyder, Promissory Estoppel In New York, 15, Brooklyn Law Review (1948).
22 Supra, note 3.
23 In Re Wheeler's Estate: The Congregation of the Fourth Presbyterian Church
of Chicago v. Continental Illinois National Bank and Truck Company of Chi-
cago, 284 Ill. App. 132, 1 N.E. (2d) 425 (1936).
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